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I. STATEMENT 0 F THE CASE 
A. STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
Connie Taylor, filed the original verified petition in the probate couri on November 12, 
2004, requesting the probate cOllli to appoint her clients as trustees of the Theodore 1. Jol111son 
Revocable Tmst. The petition was executed by R. Joh11 Taylor as a verification of the facts 
contained in the petition. Page 2 of the verified petition states under oath, "the petitirmei"s 88-
year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining bene./icim:l' of this trust by virtue o.fthe 
terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement." 
Earlier on September 9, 2004 DaHan Taylor in response to a question asking him to 
provide in his own words tlle effect of the Disclaimer Ab'1"eement, provided deposition testimony 
under oath, which recited, "And Taylor, all children are disclaiming interest in favor of their 
mother, Helen Taylor, so that she can get the remainder of her assets in the Tmst." (R. Vol 1. p. 
000582). 
Thiriy-two days later after verifying his petition before the probate couri, Jolm Taylor 
provided deposition testimony on December 14, 2004 that his mother was to receive either the 
land or any dollar amount awarded as a result of the lawsuits (R. Vol I. p. 2008). 
On January 3 1,2005 approximately 80 days after Jolm Taylor executed the verified 
petition, Reed Taylor provided deposition testimony under oath, and in response to questioning 
about who would receive the benefits of the litigation, responded that his mother "probably gets 
it all". In addition Reed Taylor furtber provided deposition testimony under oath regarding who 
would get the proceeds relating to the second lawsuit, by testifying, "My intent is -- Jim not going 
to say exa.ctly how it's going to be disbursed. My intent would be for my mother.... Well, like I 
said, as far as, uh -- I haven't talked to, specificalJy, the ones that are out of town. As far as John 
and r are concerned, LIh, we're doing it for our mother, so" When asked directly about his 
brother's anticipated benefits from the litigation, Reed Taylor provided deposition testimony 
under oath by stating, "We're not looking for money out of it, if that's where you're going". 
( R. pp. 000566, 000567). 
On May 2, 2005, John Taylor provided testimony before the Honorable Judge Beiter 
stating under oath, "Well, p1imarily, to pursue tbe claim for the trust. We have always thought it 
was a valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is the beneficiary of the trust, 
and we expect tbat we will eventually win on this claim." (R. pp. 000348,000350). 
Judge Wilper entered his Memorandum Decision and Order on July 28,2005 and held the 
Taylor Brothers, now with standing as trustees, had waived lights to rescind the contract as "once 
a pariy treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of recision, the 
right of recision is waived." ( R. p. 0006491n. 10). 
The Eagle real estate market underwent a huge increase in land valuations stmiing in 
2005. The market 2006 \flaS just full on fire. Almost out of control. You could just pretty much 
name your price for almost anything. (Tr. 2/3/11 pp. 212 In. 21 th111 214 In. 25). 
During the course of the depositions ofJolm Taylor and Dallan Taylor, the deponents 
were represented by Connie Taylor. No objections were interposed at the deposition of J 01111 
Taylor regarding his answers relating to questions regarding who was entitled to any proceeds 
involving the litigation. 111e deposition was taken after the Disclaimer At,'Teement was executed 
(Tr. 2/3/11 pp. 375 In. 15 thnl377 In. 25). No cCllTections were made relating to any deposition 
answers of JOhl1 Taylor or Dal1an Taylor relating to questions and answers as to who was the 
beneficiary under the trust after the Disclaimer Agreement was executed (Tr. 2/3/11 pp. 378 In. 1 
thm 378 In. 20). 
There never was any supplementation oftlle Taylor brothers' discovery in the Judge 
,\Vilper case relating to any changes to the beneficiary status after the Disclaimer Agreement was 
executed. There were specific requests for discovery directed to the Taylor brothers in the Judge 
Wilper matter specifically relating to any amendments to the Johnson trust. DUling the course of 
litigation the Taylor brothers provided no discovery supplements indicating there were any 
amendments or changes to the trust which relating to the beneficiary status. ((Tr. 2/4111 p. 63 In. 
7 thm In. 25). The original trust Agreement provided Helen Taylor would only receive income 
hom the C0l1JUS, which was discretionalY, but under no circumstances was Helen Taylor to 
receive anything more than income £I'om the trust. 
On April 13, 2009, Connie Taylor representing her prior husband, John Taylor, and her 
plior brother-in-law Dallan Taylor, both individually and as trustees of the trust provided her 
briefing before Judge Greenwood indicating "that petition contained a typographical elTor; it 
stated that Helen Taylor was "the sale remaining beneficiary of the Theodore Johl1son Trust by 
virtue of the tenDS of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Ab'Teement," when it should have 
stated tbat she was the sole remaining direct beneficiary." (R. p. 001289). 
II. AlDDITlfONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. i\re the Respondents entitled to their attol11eys fees on appeal? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The Independent Action Requesting the Lower Court to Set Aside the .Judgment on 
Beneficiaries' Claim.",' Should Be Granted. 
The litigants before the COUli all ab'ree that the Taylor brothers had standing to pursue 
claims in the consolidated cases captioned Taylor v. Maile 146 Jd. 705,201 P.3d 1282, (2009). 
The litigants are in serious disab'Teement over the effects of committing peljury and obtaining 
money by false pretenses during the course of litigation before Judge WiJper. 
The Respondents have failed to address tIle authority cited by Appellants contained in 
Vol 12 Moore's Federal Practice § 60-21 (4)(b), which provides that as officers of the comi the 
commission of pel jury in obtaining ajudbJment is another species of "fraud upon tIle cOUli". The 
Respondents point to tIle amended petition before tbe probate COUli as a cOlTection of the earlier 
verified petition. The amended petition before the probate comi was filed without leave of COUli 
and was done as a unilateral undelialcing immediately plior to the hearing. (R. p. 001361). The 
Respondents aIJege the amended petition before the probate COUli acts to nullifY the plior velified 
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petition by 101m Taylor, and the sworn deposition testimony of all oftbe Taylor brothers some 
six months earlier. The filing of the amended petition was the first example ofthe Taylor 
brothers and tbeir counsel playing loose and fast with the judicial system. 
The amended petition filed in tIle probate court executed on April 18, 2005 as a verified 
pleading by Jolm Taylor, described the interests of the Taylor brothers as "persons who are 
sought to be appointed are contingent beneficiaries of the Theodore L. 10hnson Revocable 
Trust". (R. 000840). The Taylor brothers had prior to the execution of the Disclaimer 
Af,'reement, described themselves in January 2004, as "plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust". (trial exhibit 110 p. 380). Before the execution of the Disclaimer 
Agreement, the Taylor brothers were residual beneficiaries destined to share in tbe corpus. This 
is the status they disclaimed. However, and this is crucial, there was nothing contingent about 
their status under tIle ten11S of tbe trust. If anything was contingent it was Helen Taylor's 
potential income interest which was solely discretionary with the trustee(s) under the tem1S of the 
trust. The Taylor brothers, under the trust, were guaranteed to receive corpus ofthe trust, unless 
of course they disclaimed tbeir interest, which is exactly what the paper trail establishes. 
Respondents point out that the Honorable Judge Greenwood believed the core of the 
appellants' case was centered on the misrepresentation by the Taylor brothers before Judge Beiter 
in tbe proceeding to obtain their judicial appointment as trustees. (Clark & Feeney Reply Briefp. 
1). The Taylor brothers in all likelihood would have been appointed sllccessor trustees regardless 
5 
of the initial verified petition or the amended petition. The verified petition of November 2004 is 
relevant to our understanding of the Taylor brothers' state of mind as to whether they considered 
themselves beneficiaries of the trllst after the execution of Disclaimer Af,'Teement. 
Judge Greenwood apparently believed that the appellants' case centered upon tbe 
misrepresentations in Judge Beiter's court. 
Although the argument is not always easy to foIImv, Berkshire's claims presented 
here all hinge on the assertion that the Taylors and their counsel committed a 
fraud on Judge Beiter by filing a petition for appointment as Trustees that 
contained a false statement. This statement somehow led Judge Beiter to appoint 
the Taylors as Trustees, giving them standing to bring the suit which ultimately 
led to Judge WiIpds deten11ination that the underlying real estate transaction was 
void. This led to the loss of the properiy. ( R. 001373). 
In fact Judge Greenwood should have realized, that the Appellants' case centered upon 
the fact that the Taylor brothers alleged to Judge Wilper to be something they were not. They 
misrepresented themselves to Judge Wilper's Couri, as beneficiaries. The only sif,'11ificant event 
in the probate proceedings was the November 2004 verified petition drafted by Connie Taylor 
and executed under oath by her husband John Taylor. The verified petition, together with otber 
evidence establishes that the Taylor brothers were no longer beneficiaries after their execution of 
the Disclaimer Af,lTeement, yet they represented to Judge Wilper that they were beneficiaries. 
Judge Beiter's appointment of the Taylor brothers, as trustees, in May 2005 did not afford the 
Taylor brotl1ers the right to commit perjury in Judge Wilper's Court regarding their status as 
beneficiaries in 2006. TIle admission under oath in probate cOllIi is impOliant because it 
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establishes the Taylor brotllers' reversal of position when they falsely claimed to be beneficimies 
in January 2006 before Judge Wilper. Tllat fraud upon the court led to the entry of the Judgment 
on BeneficiaJies' Claims. Neither the Taylor brothers nor their counsel ever advised Judge 
VVilper that they previously admitted to disclaiming their status as residual beneficiaries. This 
reversal set the stage for the fi-aud upon the cOUli. As a result of the Judgment on Beneficiaries' 
Claims, the Appellants ,vere not able to present their case against the trust. 
The amended petition filed in probate cOUli in April 2005, does not alter the swom 
testimony ofDallan Taylor, Reed Taylor and John Taylor stating that they knew they were no 
longer beneficiaries after tlle execution of tIle Disclaimer Af,'Teement. Their counsel also knew 
tbat the Taylor brothers were no longer beneficiaries oftbe trust as a resuIt oftbe Disclaimer, 
Release and Indemnity Af,'reement. When a pleading is amended or withdrawn, the superseded 
pOIiiol1 disappears fi-om the record as a judicial admission. It neveliheless exists as an utterance 
once seriously made by a party, and when admitted in evidence may be properly considered by 
tIle cOUli or jury as an item of evidence in the case. Swanson v. State ofIdaho 83 ld. 126,358 
P.2d 387 (1960) citing SbUliliffv. Extension Ditch Co., 14 Idaho 416,94 P. 574; Anderson v. 
J-Joops, 52 Idaho 757, 19 P.2d 908; Cl. T Corp. v. Elliott, 66 Idaho 384,159 P.2d 891; Stout v. 
A1cNClry, 75 IdallO 99, 267 P.2d 625. 
Tl1e recent case of Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County ofKootenni, --- P.3d ----, 2011 V/L 
2652475 (2011), cited by the Respondents does not nIter the established case lmv cited in 
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Swanson, supra. An amendment to the pleadings serves to replace the prior pleading as to 
matters involved in those proceedings. The probate proceedings had nothing to do with 
possession or title to the Linder Road property. It was a proceeding for the appointment of the 
Taylor brothers as successor trustees only. However, once a statement is made under oath it can 
be properly considered in all future legal proceedings to establish the intention of the party 
making such a statement under oath. The amended petition cIear'ly was inconsistent with the 
prior verified petition and the Taylor brothers' deposition testimony. Clearly inconsistent swom 
statements by J oh11 Taylor are relevant to the court's understanding of who was the beneficiary 
after the Disclaimer Agreement. Jolm Taylor signed the oliginal probate petition under oath and 
32 days later provided similar deposition testimony that his mother would receive the benefits of 
the litigation. The filing of the amended probate petition demonstrates playing loose and fast 
with the judicial system as the Taylor brothers and their counsel made a detel111ination in Aplil 
2005 to cbange course and assert that they remained contingent beneficiaries so they might 
benefit from that status and take advantage of their pending appeal. 
There is considerably more evidence of the commission of perjury than the initial verified 
petition in the probate proceeding. As early as March 2003, COlmie Taylor, representing tbe 
Taylor brothers knew that her clients were considering disclaiming any remainder interest in their 
Uncle Ted's trust in favor of their motber. She wrote the letter to Thomas Maile, that provided, 
" .... children are all considering disclaiming any remainder interest in their uncle Ted's trust so 
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that the trust proceeds can be distJibuted to their mothers without delay ... .I just want to be certain 
that tl1ere won't be a situation down the line where someone claims that they would not have 
disclaimed their interest ifthey had a better idea of the amount of money that was involved." ( R. 
000535). 
The Taylor Brothers in their successful attempt to gain control of the trust, after their 
initial complaint brought as beneficiaries was dismissed, provided additional evidence that tbey 
were plall11ing to disclaim their interests in the trust. On April 14,2004, Connie Taylor drafted a 
letter to Beth Rogers' attomey Bali Harwood which established that her clients, the Taylor 
brothers, would disclaim their rights as beneficiaries of the trust in exchange for the successor 
nominated trustee, Beth Rogers' cooperation and sun-ender of her trustee status, which would 
allow the Taylor brothers to gain control of the trust (R. 000561)_ The combination of the two 
letters demonstrates that the Taylor brothers were intending to disclaim their interest in the trust 
as early as March 2003. Such a declaration against interest made in the April 2004 letter was 
more than just a warning that Beth Rogers, as trustee, could be released fi-om liability if she 
provided an affidavit, as argued by the Taylor brothers in their reply brief (Taylor brothers' Reply 
Bliefp.21). The April 2004 letter is consistent with the March 2003 letter and consistent with 
the swam deposition testimony of the Taylor brothers as well as the original verified probate 
petition, in that it indicates their intent to disclaim beneficiary status. 
The record has ample evidence through deposition testimony that the Taylor brothers 
9 
treated tIle Disclaimer Af,'Teement as extinguishing their beneficiary interests in the trust. All 
tlu'ee brothers provided testimony that demonstrated tbeir intention and understanding of the 
Disclaimer Af,'Teement (see appendix 1 to tbe Appellants' Opening Blief). 
COlmie Taylor, as an officer of the court, engineered the process for her clients to gain 
control of the trust and lmew her clients' intentions of disclaiming their interest in the tmst. 
C01111ie Taylor as counsel for the Taylor Brothers sat tlu'ough deposition testimony as her clients 
admitted that Helen Taylor was to receive the full benefits of any litigation. COlmie Taylor 
flllther knew that prior to the Disclaimer Af,rreement, Helen Taylor had no right under the tmst to 
receive any pOIiion of the trust COIVUS (R. 000432 In.9 thm 25). Tbe trust specifically provided 
that after tbe death of Ted Johnson, the trustee could pay to, or apply for the benefit of Helen 
Taylor, Hazel Fisher, Betty FamwOlih, and Joyce Selley, such sums from the income of their 
20% share of the COl1JUS of the trust, as the Trustee deems reasonable for the maintenance, 
education, suppOli and health of the said beneficiary dllling tbeir lifetime. Helen Taylor had no 
light to obtain any principal or cOl1JUS of the trust, a fact well known to the officers of the cOUli. 
Ultimately the Taylor brothers, aided by their attomeys, pell)etrated peljmy upon the distlict 
court in filing their amended complaint representing that they were beneficjaries in January 2006 
after tbe Supreme Comi ruled that beneficiaries have a right to sue. 
49 CJS § 672. (2011) Collusion, perjury, or other misconduct-Perjury and subomation 
of perjury provi des: 
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PerjUlyor false sweaIing is a species of intrinsic, not extrinsic, fraud, and hence 
the 111le against f,'Tanting reIieffor perjury is in accordance with the general rule 
tbat relief in equity ordinarily cannot be had for intrinsic fi-aud_ However, if tbe 
perjury prevents a full adversari al trial of the issues, or improperly procures tbe 
court's jurisdiction and judf,'111ent, then such peljll1Y is extrinsic and relief against a 
judf,'111ent so obtained may be had in equity .... 
it has been 11eld that where a lawyer engages in a conspiracy to commit a fi-aud on 
the court by the production offabricated evidence, and by such means obtains a 
judgment, a court of equity may grant relief against the juclf,'111ent. Similarly, it has 
been held that subornation of perjUly by an attomey or the intentional 
concealment of documents by an attomey constitute "extrinsic fi-aud," and allows 
ajuclb'111ent to be set aside due to fi'aud upon the comi. 
The underlying case before Judge Wilper involved two consolidated matters. The first 
action was filed by the Taylor brothers while they were still beneficiaries of the trust, in J anUaIY 
2004. The second of the consolidated matters was the suit filed by the Taylor brothers as trustees 
of the t111st in July 2004 after the execution of the Disclaimer A):,,'Teement. Ultimately, based 
upon the perjUly by tbe Taylor brothers that they remained beneficiaries of the trust, Judge 
Wilper entered his Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judb'l11ent on Beneficiaries' 
Claim on May 15, 2006. The Orcler Jed to the Jud2,'ment on Benefici31ies' Claims which was 
entered on July 2006. Tbe Judf,'111ent provided: 
This cause came on before the Honorable Ronald J. Wilper for hearing on a 
Motion for Summmy Judf,'1nent on tlle Beneficiaries' Claim. Based upon the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained withinthis COUli's May 15, 
1006 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summ31Y Judf,'111ent on Beneficiaries' 
Claim, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 
as fo11O\\1s, 
... The title to the property commonly refelTed to as "the Linder Road properiy" 
and more p3Iiicularly desclibed in Paraf,'Taph 3 of this Judf,'111ent shall be quieted 
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to the Theodore L. Jo1111son Revocable Trust, in fee simple ... 
The Defendants' remaining counterclaims and affinmtive defenses, all of which 
were based on eitller equitable claims or the asseltion that the Plaintiffs were 
wrongfully interfering with the Defendants' light to possess the Linder Road 
Property, are hereby dismissed. Specifically, those claims are as follows: 
A. Counterclaim I (tOliuous interference with contract between Defendants 
and their lending institution) 
B. Counterclaims VII and VIII (equitable estoppel and Quasi-Estoppel) .... 
(R. 000119) . 
Thereafter tbe Appellants attempted before Judge Wi1per to have their claims to the title 
against the trust adjudicated upon equitable principles. Judge Wilper entered his Memorandum 
Decision and Order 011 July 15, 2006 again reiterating his position set fOlih in the Jud!;,'111ent on 
Beneficiaries' Claims. The Memorandum Decision and Order of July 15,2006 recited: 
The COUIi finds that the effect of the COUli's imposition ofa constructive trust on 
the Linder Road propeliy is the reconveyance of the propeliy to tl1e Trust and the 
quieting of the title in favor of the Trust. See Klein v. Shaw, 109 Idaho 237, 140, 
706P.2d 1348,1351 (Ct. App.1985)(ho1clingthatapaliyuponwhoa 
constructive trust is imposed "is treated as if he or she had been an express tmstee 
hom the date of the wrongful holding and is required to reconvey tbe property to 
the plaintiff); see also I.e. § 6-410 (describing an action to quiet title as that 
"brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real or 
personal propeliy adverse to him, for the PU!1Jose of deten11ining such adverse 
claim"). (R. 000119). 
T11e taking of tJ1e real propelty without any consideration of any of the equitable positions 
between the trust and appellants before Judge Wi1per was solely a result of the peljury committed 
by the Taylor brothers in falsely asserting their role as residual beneficiaries of the trust in 1006. 
As stated by Justice Eism3I111 in Taylor v. Maile II, "Mai1es have not argued on appeal that the 
appropriate remedy for closing the sale without cOUli approval would be to set aside only the 
12 
closing, rather than also setting aside tbe contract of sale. Thus, we have not addressed tbe 
appropriate scope oftlle remedy for a violation ofIclaho Code § 68-1 08 (b)". The MaiIes lost 
their opportunity to address before Judge Wilper any issues between tbe tmst and the Appellants. 
The Taylor brothers' perjury prevented a full adversarial trial of the issues before Judge Wilper, 
CJS § 672, supra. The above authority does not require that one losing rights to a fair and full 
adjudication as a result of perjury must attempt to con-ect the same by appeal. Respondents argue 
that tbeMailesfiledtheirnoticeofappealandraisedthisconceptinTaylor;v.Maile II (Taylor 
brothers' Reply Briefp. 4). Only standing was argued as heing affected by tIle Tay]or brothers' 
misconduct, however, no issue was raised relating to any cause of action related to the criminal 
activity of Taylor brothers or their attomeys. The merits of the claims were never presented nor 
detennined. Standing is focused not on the merits of the issues raised, but upon the pmiy who is 
seeking tbe relief. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Id. 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). 
The appellants were assured by tIle .§,'Tantor of the trust and tIle successor trustees, the 
Rogers, that tbe trust virould stand by the transaction (R. 000539). The Motion for Summary 
Judgment in February 2006 was based solely upon the Taylor brothers' criminal conduct in 
committing perjury and obtaining money by false pretenses based upon the asseriion that they 
were residual beneficiaries in 2006. ( R. pp. 000655, 000660). 
The Respondents have argued this matter is analogist to the case of Rae v. Bunce 
145 ld. 798, 186 P.3d 654 (2008). (Clark & Feeney Reply Blief p. 9). Tlle Rae matter involved 
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a claim of a fi'aud upon the cOUli, based upon opposing counsel's submission of a proposed order 
by mail not by motion. The present matter involves a complaint against officers of the cOUli who 
are alleged to have acted in the following manner: 
That all defendants, acted with oppressive, fl:audulent, wanton, malicious or 
outrageous conduct as aIIeged above. That defendants acted in a manner that 
was "an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act 
was perfol111ed by the defendants with an understanding of or disregard for its 
likely consequences" and tbat the defendants acted with an extremely harmful 
state of mind, whether that be tenned "malice, oppression, fi'aud or b'ross 
negligence", "malice, oppression, wantOlli1eSS; l! or simply "deliberate and 
willful." Tbat defendants well lmew that tbe above conduct would be oppressive 
as to the plaintiffs and others. (R. 000080). 
The present matter deals \vith peljury, subordination of perjury and obtaining money by 
false pretenses. Tbe two matters are as different as day and night. The pariy asseliing a claim of 
fi-aud on the c01..l1i must establish t11at CU1 unconscionable plan or scheme was used to improperly 
influence the cOUli's decision and that such acts prevented the losing party fi'om fully and fairly 
presenting its case or defense. Rae, supra. 
The burden is on the claimant to prove sufficient facts to set aside ajudb'ment, by clear 
and convincing evidence. LR.C.P., Rule 60(b)(3). Kuhn v. Caldwell Banker Landmark, Inc. 150 
ld. 240, 245 P .3d 991 (1010). The records clearly establishes the Respondents actively engaged 
in conduct that played loose and fast with the judicial system which ultimately amounted to 
criminal conduct. The climinal conduct of tbe respondents is clearly established in the record. 
The deposition testimony of Dallan Taylor is entirely consistent with the velified petition 
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before the probate comi as executed in November 2004. The deposition testimony of Jolm 
Taylor is entirely consistent with the verified petition before the probate court as executed in 
November 2004. The deposition testimony of Reed Taylor is entirely consistent with the 
verified petition before the probate comi as executed in November 2004. The testimony ofJolm 
Taylor before the probate cOUli in May 2005 is entirely consistent with the verified petition 
before the probate court as executed in November 2004. The letter of Marcb 2003 authored by 
COlmie Taylor is entirely consistent with tbe verified petition before the probate comi as 
executed in November 2004. The letter of April 2004 allthored by Connie Taylor is entirely 
consistent with the verified petition before the probate court as executed in November 2004. 
However, if that verified petition of November 2004 contained a typo as ar!;,TLled by the Taylor 
brothers, all the other testimony, and aU the Jetters are in eITor. The recent case ofNC-D.H., Inc, 
v. Gamer, 218 P.3d 853 (Nev, 2009) provides: 
The most wideJy accepted definition, which we adopt, holds that the concept 
embraces only that species of fi'aud which does, or attempts to, subveri the 
integrity of the comi itself, or is a fi'aud pell)etrated by officers of the court so that 
the jlldicial machinery cannot perform in tbe usual marmer its impaliial task of 
adjudging cases ... and relief sbould be denied in the absence of such conduct. 
In addition to his duties to his clients, a lawyer also owes a duty of" loyalty to the 
comi, as an officer thereof, that demands integrity and honest dealing with tbe 
court. And whenbe departs [r'om that standard in tbe conduct of a case he 
per]Jetrates [r'aud upon the comi," We lawyers, judges, and practitioners alike are 
very ... concemed about how our profession is perceived. We're velY proud of 
what yve believe is an honorable profession and-we're velY concemed when 
something like this bappens. It hurts us all. It really does. 
If a party establishes that ar1 unconscionable plan or scheme was used to improperly 
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inf1uence the couri's decision, and that such acts prevented the losing party £i'om fully and fairly 
presentil1g his case or defel1se, then "fi'aud on the comi" exists. In re Paternity of Tomiki, 518 
N.E.2d 500 (Incl. App. 1988). The party asserting a claim of £i',md on the court must est::tblish 
that an unconscionable plan or scheme was used to improperly influence the COlllt's decision and 
tbat such acts prevented the losing party £i'om fully and fairly presenting its case or defense. 47 
Am..Tllr. 2d, .Tuclsrments § 728 (2006). As stated in the case of Hmtford v. Hmiford 53 Ohio 
App.2d 79,371 N.E.2d 591 (Ohio App. 1977): 
Vvhile no precise definition offraucl upon the court is possible, we believe, like 
most courts consideril1g the matter, that the term as used in regard to obtaining 
relief B'om judgment must be nan-owly construed to embrace only that type of 
conduct which de:6les the court itself, or fraud which is pel1)etrated by officers of 
the COllrt so as to prevent the judicial system B-om functioning in the custommy 
manner of deciding the cases presented in an impartial manner. 
The Appellants' independent action to set aside tIle Jud~::,'ment on Beneficiaries' Claim 
should be b'Tanted, as officers of the comi actively conspired to commit peljury to obtain a 
judgment that precluded the appellants from presenting their full case in the consolidated matter 
before Judge vVilper. 
B. The Appellants Did Act in a Prudent Mauner in Asserting the Taylor Brothers Lacked 
Standing and Did Act 'Within a ReasonaiJie Time in Filing Their Independent Action to Set 
Aside the Judgment 0111 Beneficiaries' Claiu!... 
In Idaho our (omi's have ruJed that an independent action under I.R.C.P. 
60(b) may be brought ·within a reasonable time. The question of reasonableness is ordinmily a 
question of fact to be resolved by tl1e trier of fact. Claims brought under I.R.C.P. 60(b) are not 
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baITed by res judicata because they are one of the recognized "avenues ... for attacking a 
juclgment Davis v. Parish, 13 lTd. 595, 961 P.ld 119 (1998). 
An independent action to set aside ajudt,'l11ent can be based upon the doctrine of "fj'aud 
on tbe couri". 7 Moore's Feeleral Proctice ~ 60.33. However, unlike an action for extrinsic fi'aucl, 
an action for "fi-aud on the COLlli" is not limited by laches and may be brought at anytime. 7 
Moore's Federal Practice ~ 60.33. See In re Patemity of Tomiki, Sllpra. H Fraud on the cOlJri" is a 
claim that exists to protect the integlity of the judicial process, and tberefore a claim for fl.-aud on 
the cOlni cannot be time-balTed. 12 James We. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 
60.21 [4][gJ & 11.52 (3d ed.2009) (citing Lacewood v. Bowls, 46 FRAT 625,634 (D.D.C.1969). 
TIle appellants discovered the impact of the respondents' criminal activity while 
prepming tbeir appellants' opening brief in Taylor v. Maile II. Six months had expired since 
Judge Wilper entered tbe Jud[;,'ment on Beneficiaries' Claim. Consequently, the only way for the 
Appellants to bring the misconduct to the COUli's attention was to present an argument relating 
to issues of standing. T11e issue of standing is jmisdictional, and it may be raised at any time. 
Tungsten Holdings Inc., v. Drake, 143 Td. 69, 72,137 P.3d 456,459 (2006). 
Respondents argue that the appellants are simply attempting to take another bite at the 
apple. This is untrue, fraud upon the COUJi as an issue or claim has never been tried or 
detennined, only standing was discussed and determined. There is no dispute that the Tnyl or 
brothers bad standing to sue under Taylor v. Maile II. Standing does not confer a benefit upon a 
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litigant to commit perjury, subom perjury or obtain money by false pretenses. Standing doe not 
confer a benefit lIpan a litigant which results in the opposing pariy fi'om fairly and fully having 
an adjudication of a]] claims, including the claims in the Judge Wilper matter that may have 
existed between the appellants and tbe trust. 
Appellants argument that the Taylor brotbers committed misconduct was advanced to 
defeat their standing. The SlIpreme Court in Taylor v. Maile found the Taylors bad standing. The 
appellants filed this action in December 2007 while tbe appeal was still pending. 
Although the JlIdf,'I11ent on Beneficiaries' Claims was entered by Judge Wilper in July 
2006, there remained the question of unjust emiclm1ent which was tried in October 2006. That 
trial involved a claim of unjust enrichment to the trust's right to title, it l1ad nothing to do with 
the balancing of equities between the pariies. The Appellants filed the independent action wbile 
the appeal was pending, mindful of the requirement that Rule 60 (B) requires a "reasonable time" 
for the filing of tbe independent action. Given the fact that there remained issues to be tried 
before Judge Wilper and tbe appellants had to prepare for such a trial, raising the matter as ar1 
issue of standing and almost simultaneously filing an independent action to setaside the 
judgmen t was reasonable. Rule 60(b) is silent as to when an independent action Ciln be 
maintained based upon criminal activity. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to concluding 
that all matters involving fi'aud and/or criminal conduct wOlIld have to be filed 1,vithin six months 
of the date of Judb'111ent. 
18 
C. The Crirnimul Activity of tine Respondents Defeats LA.ny ,AppEncatioEil of tine Doctrine of 
Res Judkata. 
4. 7 Am. Our. 2d .T Udf::,'111ents § 537, provides the C!ppropriate standard in determining ifres 
judicCltCI should apply under tIle facts of this case. The Appellants were denied the opportllnity to 
present their case against the trust, before Judge Wilper. The pCI:jury by the Taylor brothers gave 
Judge Wilper the wrongful impression tlwt the Taylor brothers held a financial interest in the 
corpus of the trust in 2006. However, in truth and fact, tbe Taylor brothers bargained away their 
interests in the trust to gain control of tbe trust, as trustees in July 2004. This was done to 
acJVClI1ce a lawsuit by the trust when their own lawsuit was dismissed. 
The case of Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Numbers and Co., 431 F.3d 353 
C.A.9 (Hawaii 2(05) provides law which explains that once fi'aud has been demonstrated in prior 
litigation, other l1ol1-fi-aud claims are permissible. TIle Living Desi&'11, supra, relied upon 
certification responses from the Hawaii Supreme Court, and held at 373 of 431 F. 3d: 
The district COUli also enoneously dismissed Plaintiffs' non-fraud claims on the 
grounds of the litigation privilege. Matsuura III, 330 F. Supp.2d at 1128. In 
Matsuura II, the HJwaii Supreme Court stated that "Hawaii COUlis have applied an 
absolute litigation privilege in defamation actions for words and writings that me 
material and peliinent to jlidicial proceedings." 73 P.3d at 692. The COUli 
examined the policy considerations behind the privilege and decided not to 
expand tlle protection of the privilege to claims outside of defamation actions, 
holding tbat "uncler Ha\vaii Jaw, a paliy is not immune from liability for civil 
damages based upon that party's fJ'aud engaged in during prior litigation 
proceedings." Td. at 700, 706. TIle court appears to emphasize that many of the 
policies vveighing against the application of the privilege do so only \Iv'hen fraud 
was committed in the prior proceedings. Id. at 693-99. In Clccordance with tbe 
Hawaii'I Supreme COllli's analysis, so long CIS a cause of action for fraud is 
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asselied, the litigation privilege does not protect subsequent litigation asserting 
other causes of action stemming fl:om the fraud allegedly conm1itted in prior 
proceedings. Thus, we hold that Plaintiffs' non-fi'aud claims are not ban-ed by the 
litigation privilege under Hawaii law. 
The action of the Respondents in misrepresenting their status as beneficiaries of the hust 
in 2006 amounted to criminal conduct. Criminal behavior as alJeged in this case is more severe 
than fraud. The actions of the Respondents should not be tolerated as they demonstrate tampering 
with the administration of justice in Idaho and should be a clear exception to any defense of res 
judicata. The non fi'aud claims set forth in the amended complaint need to be resolved by the 
trier of fact and cannot be ban-ed by res judicata. 
D. The Doctrine of Res Judicata Does Not Apply. 
Neither issue preclusion nor claim preclusion apply. Five factors are required in order for 
issue preclusion to bar the re-litigation of an issue detennined in a prior proceeding: (1) the party 
against whom the earlier decision was asseried had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue 
decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue 
presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the 
prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the 
pariy against whom the issue is asseried was a pariy or in privity with a pariy to the litigation. 
TicorTitle Co. v. S tani on 144 Id. 119,157 P.3d 613, (2007). Justice Eismann's concuning 
opinion establishes that not all the issues were resolved in Taylor v. Maile n. As Justice 
Eismann indicated, the appropriate scope of the remedy for a violation of Idaho Code § 
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68-1 08(b) was not 1i tigated nor detenl1ined as an issue 011 Taylor v. Maile II. The Respondents' 
criminal behavior ancUor the effects thereof were not issues which were actually decided. 
RegardJess of whether an issue is explicitly set forth in the party's brief as one of tbe iSSUES on 
appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or 
authority, it cannot be considered by the appellate couri. Taylor v. ALA Services Corp. WL 
3904754 (Idaho 2011), Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374, 134 P.3d 696, 698 (2010). Issue 
preclusion does not apply to the present mJtter. 
Idaho uses a transactional approach to claim preclusion. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. 
Kuenzli, 134 Ie!. 222, .226, 999 P.2d 877, 88 I (2000). "The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not 
only subsequent re-litigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent re-litigation of 
any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have 
been made." Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 PJd 803, 805 (2002). Claim preclusion 
has three elements: (1) same pariies or their privies; (2) same claim; and (3) final judf,'111ent. 
Tacker Ti't1e Co. v. Station, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613, 618 (2007). Watkins v. Peacock 
145 Iel. 704, 184 P.3d 210(2008). TIle Appellants had no callse of action or claim until hlclge 
vVilper entered the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim. Moreover, the Decision in Taylor v. 
Iv1cNicbols, 149 TeL 826,243 P.3d 642 (2010), holds that a valid claim against an opposing 
attomey must wait until tlle conclusion of the underlying litigation. 
The Respondents argue that the appellants' claims are baITed because the appellants 
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arguably incurred "some damages" during the proceedings before Judge Wilper. The existence 
of objectively ascertainable injury is simply an analytical tool to be used in detell11ining, as basis 
for tbe Clccrual of a professional malpractice action, when "some damage" has occurred. Stuard v. 
Jorgenson, 150 Id. 701,249 P.3d 1156 (2011). The "some damage" ruJe has been Llsed to 
determine if an applicJble statute oflimitations applies in a professional mJlpractice case. TIle 
case of Taylor v. McNichols, Sllpra, establishes that because of the complexity ofmoclem 
litigation, one cannot deten11ine the scope of an opposing counsel's wrongful condllct until the 
underlying case is cone! uded. This reasoning is applicable to the present matter in detem1ining 
that neither claim preclusion nor "some damage" rule applies in this case. Even through the 
Respondents committed peJjury in MJfch 1006, there was no definitive amount of attomeys fees 
relating solely to t1wt point. The case continued through trial in October 2006 on the Maile's 
counter-claim. One c<JmJot objectively detem1ine when some d~U11ages were incuned relating to 
attomey fees and as sllch tIl ere is no res judicata defense. 
TIle Respondents have arf,'1.lcd tllat tIle Appellants claims for 1egalmalpractice were 
frivolous. (Taylor brothers' Reply Briefp. 13). This is a bllacious argument on the pmi of the 
Taylors, because tbe Appellants never alleged attomey malpractice. 
In tIle present matter tbe appelletnts claim among otller things, the respondents were 
negligent in misrepresenting to the comi their clients' status JS beneficiaries under tIle trust, 
when in prior swom pleadings and plior testimony it was established that tbe Taylor brotllers' 
mother was the sole beneficiary of the trust as aresuIt of the Disclaimer AbIfeement. The 
attomeys prepared the clocllmentation containing the pe1jured testimony, had previously prepared 
documents containing the true facts, filed pleadings asserting facts the attomeys knew were not 
true, and had participated in deposition and comi proceedings establishing the true f;Jct that tIle 
Taylor brothers' mother was tbe sole beneficiary of the trust. 
Tbe allegations of the amended complaint allege conduct and an agreement betv/een the 
Respondents to accomplish an unlawful objective. ( R. 000257). Such a civil conspiracy is not, 
by itself, a claim for relief Tbe essence of a cause of action for civil conspiracy is the civil wrong 
committed as the objective of the conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself. Mmmos v. Moss, 143 Id. 
927,931, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007). Such wrongful conduct give lise to a number of civil 
remedies, to wit: (l) the Taylor brothers and the attomey Respondents conm1itted wrongful acts 
that are prohibited under tbe Idaho Racketeering Statue (Count Eleven); (2) the Respondents 
committed acts tbat constitute abuse of process (Count Five); (3) tbe Respondents committed a 
fraud upon the comi (COll11t One); (4) the Respondents committed wrongful conduct in filing a 
verified pleading which was diametrically opposite to an earlier verified pleading previously 
submitted by tbe Respondents before another tribunal, requiring an imposition of a constructive 
trust (Count Two); (5) the Respondents committed acts constituting negligence and/or 6'T08S 
negligence (Count Six and Eight); (6) the Respondents committed acts which constitute equitable 
estoppel, quasi estoppel and/or judicial estoppel, (Counts Nine, Ten, and Twelve). 
The elements of negligence are well established: (1) duty; (1) breach; (3) causation; and 
(4) damages. EDtJte ofBed:er v. CaJJahan, 140 Td. 522, 516, 96 P.3d 613,627 (2004). As it 
general rule, an attomey will be held liCible for negligence only to his or her client and not to 
someone with whom tbe attorney c10es not have un attomey-cJient relatiollsllip. HalTigfeld v. 
Hancock, 140 leI. 134,90 P.3d 884 (2004), Wick v. Eastman, 122 Id. 698,838 P.2c1301 (1992). 
However, our SlIpreme Court 11as indicated that a cbim can exist between a non-client and an 
attoll1ey for a c13i111 of negligence. See McPheters v. Maile, 138 rd. 391, 395, 64 P Jd 317, 3:21 
(2003). 
A pari)' is not immune from liability for civil damages based upon that 
party's fraud engaged in during plior litigation proceedings. Matsuura v. EJ. Du Pont De 
Numbers, 102 Hawaii 149,73 P.3d 687 (2003). A third pmty con hold a lawyer liabJe if the 
attomey exceeds the scope of11is employment or acts for personal gain or substantially assisting 
in a client's breach of fiduciary duty. Attomeys must not knowingJy counselor assist a client in 
committing a crime or £I"aud. Taylor v. ]vfcNichols, supra. The Appellants have alleged 
sufficient facts against the attomeys indicating the att0ll1eys activeJy participated in perpetrating 
a fraud upon the court which created damages to the Appellants. 
TIle Appell[mts were denied the opporhmity to present their case against tbe trust before 
Judge Wilper. The peljury by the Taylor brothers gave Judge Wilper the wrongful impression 
that the Taylor brotbers were beneficiaries and had a fin::mcial interest in the corplls oftlle trust in 
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2006. In truth, the Toylorbrotllers bargained away their interests in the trust to gain control of 
the trust in 2004 to advance a lawsuitby the trust when their own lawsuit was dismissed. The 
AppeUants have alleged valie! claims against the respondents which are not barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata. 
E. A AppHcation of Lwvl" of tile Case Does Not Apply Because of Respondents' Criminal 
Behavior. 
Fraue! vitiates everything it touches. Tusch EnteIlJlises v. Coffin ]13 Id. 37, 740 P.2d 
1022 (1987). Fraud upon tIle court makes void the orders and jue!b,'111ents of that court. An 
attempt to commit "fraud upon the cOUli" vitiates the entire proceeding and deprives tbe court of 
subject matter jurisdiction. In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill. App.2d 393 (1961). A decision 
produced by fi'aud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final. 
Fraud vitiates a judf,'111ent caused by tIle active agency of some party to the proceeding, as the 
couri is misled and deceived as to the facts upon which it attempts to administer the law, ane! the 
mistake is equally efficacious in procuring a wrong. Trim v. Trim, 33 So.3d 471 (Miss. 10] 0). 
TIle Respondents' criminal behavior constitutes a fraue! upon the COlui and deprives the 
couli of subject matter jurisdiction. There can be no law of case under tbese facts. Under the law 
ofthe case doctrine, \vben "tIle Supreme COllIi, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion 
a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law (lfthe 
case, and must be adhered to thJOughout its subsequent progress, both in the district court and 
upon subsequent appeaL" The rule is well established and long adhered to in this state that 
where, upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a ca.se states in its opinion a principle or 
rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must 
be adhered to thTOughout its subsequent prob,rress, both in the trial conrt and upon subsequent 
appeal. ... If In re Barker v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 110 Td. 871,872, 719 P.2cl 1131, 1132 
(1986)(citing Suitts v. First Security Bank ofIdaho, 110 rd. 15, 713 P.2d 13 74 (1985)). 
The present action is an independent action under I.R.C.P. Rule 60 to set aside a 
judb'111ent based upon fraud upon the COUli and for claims for damages as a result oflitigation 
misconduct by the Respondents. The law of the case doctrine has no application to the CUlTent 
proceedings. The Respondents arf,TLJed that the stcmding oftlle Taylor was "law ofthe case" 
before the district court (Taylor brothers' Reply Briefp. 9). However, under the "law oftl1e 
case!! principle, on a second or subsequent appeal the comis generally will not consider errors 
which arose prior to the first appeal and which might have been raised as issues in the earlier 
appeal. See 5 Am . .Tur.1d Appeal and En"or § 752 (1962). The doctrine discourages piecemeal 
appeals and is consistent witb the broad scope of claim preclusion under the analogous doctril1e 
of res judicata . .Tanmm v. Hale, 111 Td. 951,842 P.ld 188 (C.A. 1991). 
Respondents' contention that "law of the case" applies, is elToneous, bec<luse this case is 
not about standing but rather tbe effects of criminal behavior in obtaining a judgment. If the law 
ofthe case is strictly applied there could never be a Rule 60(B) independent action filed \vhen 
there are allegations of crimina! conduct that amount to tampering with the administration of 
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justice. Fraud upon the COllli "will be found only in the presence of such tampering with the 
administration of justi ce as to suggest a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and 
safegLlclrd tbe public. Compton v. Compton, 101 JeL 328, 334, 612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (! 980), 
quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hmtforcl Empire Co., 322 U.S. 1.38, 246 (1944). 
\Vhen an issue of standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues raised, but 
upon the party who is seeking the relief Scona Inc. v. Green Vvil10w Trust, 133 Id. 283,286, 
985 P .2d 1145, 1148 (1999). There is no present issue raised by the AppeJIants cOl1ceming the 
standing oftlle Taylor Brothers. Simply because one has standing to sue, that does not afford the 
right or privilege to obtain ajudgmentbasecl upon peljllJY that deprives an opposing pariy their 
right to an adjudication of their claims and defenses. There is no "law of the case" that applies to 
tIle present claims. 
F. Tile Consideration of Extrinsic Evidence and Parol Evidence Is Permissible in 
Establisbing That the Taylor Brothers Conmlitted Perjury and Obtained Money by False 
Pretenses. 
The Taylor brothers themselves lmew wl1at tbeir beneficial interest in the trust was after 
they executed the Disclaimer Af,rreement in ]004. The Taylor brothers k11ew the truth of the 
misreprese11tation as it was solely within their intention. There has been no judicial 
detenllinatiol1 that the Taylor brothers remained beneficiaries after the 2004 Disclaimer 
Af,'Teement. The Taylor brothers arh'1le tbat the letter of April 2004 aut]lored by CC)]111ie Taylor is 
inadmissible as parol evidence. (Taylor brothers' Reply Briefp.22). There is no merger under 
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these circumstances. The Respondents failed to strike the letter [r'om consideration before tbe 
lower court and are precluded [r'om arglling new matter at the appeJIate level. 
A latent ambiguity exists wbere an instrument is clear on its bce, bLlt loses tklt clarity 
when applied to the t~lctS as they exist. Cool v. Mountainview Landowners Coop. Ass'n, 139 Id. 
no, 772, 86 P.3cl 484, 486 (2004). Although parol evidence generally cannot be submitted to 
contradict, vary, add or sllbtract [r'om the tenl1S of a written af,'Teement that is deemed 
unambiguolls on its face, there is an exception to this general rule where a latent ambiguity 
appears. Salfeety v. Seidem an ( In re Estate of Kirk), 127 Id. 817, 824, 907 P .2d 794, 801 
(1995). V/11ere the facts in existence reveal a latent ambiguity in a contract, the court seeks to 
determine the intent of tIle pmiies at the time tbey entered into the contract. Knipe Land Co. v. 
Robertson, 201 1 WL 2039635 (Idabo 2011). 
The two 1 etters authored by COlmie Taylor ( R. 000535, 000561) like any other foml of 
evidence can be used to demonstrate inconsistent statements and impeach the one who uttered 
such a statement. Tbe letters, like tbe Taylor brothers' sworn testimony, contradict the Taylor 
brothers' and their counsels' aIIegation that a typographical enor existed in tbe verified petition 
in November 2004. Carmie Taylor's letter of Apri114, 2004 is proximately related in time to the 
swam stMements llnder oath a few months later contained in tbe verified petition in the probate 
proceedings on November 11,2004. The letters in the record are yet additional examples 
evidencing the Respondents' cIiminal conduct. 
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G. The Appellants Were DeIl)rived of Their Fundamental Right to Faidy and Fully 
Adjudicate Their Claims Before Judge Wilper. 
Tbe Taylor brothers argue that there is no consequence, even if tlley committed peljUlY to 
obtain a jUdf,'111en t. The Taylor brothers argue the land transaction was declared void and 
rescission was not an issue for detemlination. (Taylor brothers' Reply Bliefp. I I). The case of 
State v. WolfJ-ul11, 145 Id. 44, 175 P.3d 206, '(Ct. App. 2007), in defIning the elements of a charge 
of peIjury, explain that the test for materiality is whether the testimony probably could influellce 
a court on tl1e issue before it. The false statement need not bear directly upon tIle ultimate issue 
offact. The de2::,rree ofmateliaIity is not important.... It is sufficient that it was material, and might 
have been used to affect such proceeding. 
Although tbe Appellants requested Judge Wilper to balance the equities between the trust 
and themselves, Judge Wilper denied such a requests. All that remained in Judge Wilper's 
opinion was a tlial on tl1e unjust eruic1ullent claim relating to the enhanced value of the forty acre 
parcel improved by the Appellants. The Respondents fail to address the established case law in 
Idaho which allows a claim to title and possession of real propeliy when the Stahlte of Frauds is 
violated. The Appellants were led to believe by the Taylor brothers' predecessor, Beth Rogers 
that t1le trust Vi/auld honor the real estate transaction. Based upon written assurances, the 
Appellants proceeded to incur building costs to their detriment. Because Judge Wilper believed 
tbe Taylor brothers were beneficiaries no determination was made involving the relationship 
between tbe trust and the Appellants. Judge Wilper's COUli never resolved any of the issues 
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SUlTOl.lI1ding the detriment to the Mailes of investing monies to develop real property acquired in 
a transaction thM the successor trustee Beth Rogers assured them the trust would honor. (R. 
00053c)). 
TIle case of Gamer v. Bmischi, 139 Td. 430, 80 P.3d 1031 (2003) provides the elements 
of quasi-estoppel. TIle Gamer, supra, case held: 
Quasi-estoppel prevents a pariy £'0111 reaping un unconscionable advantage, or 
from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by changing 
positions. Ltmders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Id. 689, 695, 963 P.2d 372,378 
(1998). Quasi-estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel, does not require 
misrepresentation by one party or actual reliance by tne other. .. 
The elements of quasi-estoppel have been defined as follows: 
[IJt precludes a pmiy [r'om asseriing to another's disadvantage a right inconsistent 
with a position previously taken by him or her. TIle doctrine applies where it 
would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent 
with one in which he acquiesced or of which he accepted a benefit. The act of the 
pmiy against whom the estoppel is sought must have gained some advantage to 
himself or produced some disadvantage to another; or the person invoking tlle 
estoppel must have been induced to change his position. 
If a contract is illegal and void, the cOUli will leave the pmiies as it finds them and refuse 
to enforce the contract. Wemecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. # 401,147 Id. 277, 287, 207 
P.3d 1008,1018 (2009). Ifa land transaction is fullyperfollDed and all the obligations attempted 
to be done by such contract became accomplished facts, the mal111er in which the contract was 
first executed is no longer tbe controlling issue. FaITar v. Parish, 42 Id. 451,245 P. 934 (1926). 
The Appellants were denied their day in comi relating to the remedies available vv'ith tbe 
trust, as referenced by Justice Eismm1l1, in Taylor v. Maile II. Judge Wilper precluded SUc:ll an 
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adjudication solely as a reslllt of the criminal behavior of the Respondents. 
H. the Jury Verdict Cm Not Stano. 
The Taylor brothers asseli that the Appellants' filing of the peI]Ury complaint was with no 
legitimate tactual or legal basis and was a violation ofI.R.C.P. Rule 11 (a)(l), which is 
sanctionable under Idaho Code § 12-123, which demonstrates an improper use of the legal 
system. (Taylor brothers' Reply Briefp. IS). The appellants have never been sanctioned under 
Rule 11 either by Judge Wilper or Judge Greenwood. The Taylor brothers specificaIly requested 
sanctions against the appellants, for the filing of a motion to foreclose their vendee's lien in 
Judge Wilper's Court and at the same time proceeding with t1le Cl.l1Tent action before Judge 
Greenwood. Judge WiIper on March 10,2010, entered his Order Denying Defendants' Motion 
for Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions. (R. 001614). 
Being fully appraised of tIle record in both his case and Judge Greenwood's case, Judge WiIper 
stated, "the COUli finds that Defendants' motion to foreclose the vendee's lien is not without a 
basis in law or fact and was reasonable under the circumstances. Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions 
is denied". (R. 001618). The very fact that the Judge Wilper found in March 2010, that tllere 
were no sanctionable offenses in proceeding with two cases in litigation, makes it even harder to 
understand how a jury could disa&'Tee. The paint of Judge Wilper's detem1ination shows tbat 
litigants, such as the Appellants, had a reasonable basis to pursue the exact course of action 
undeliaken by the appeIIants. There can not be a finding that there was a wiIIful improper use of 
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legal process in the regular COllrse of the proceeding, and/or (2) the act was committed for an 
ulterior, improper pUlvose. If it were otllerwise Judge Wilper would have sanctioned the actions 
of the Appellants in :/I.1m-cll 20 I O. The jury verdict undenllinecl the prior ruling by Judge Wilper 
\vhich was determined upon the same record which the jury considered. The Verdict therefore 
cannot stanc!o 
The appell,mts voluntarily withdrew their Notice of Lis Pendens on July I 3,2009 in 
Judge Greenwood's proceedings some 10 days after Judge Greenwood"s Memorandum Decision 
and Order dismissing the Appel1ants' complaint. Earlier, in Judge Wilper case, Judge 'iVilper 
had ordered tllat a lis pendens could be maintained during an appeal. 
Judge \Vilper ruled upon tbe Taylor brothers' motion to stlike the Lis Pendens which was 
filed P110r to the Judge Wilper appeal. TIle Taylors brothers in the litigation before Judge Wilper 
in 2007, requested that his court strike the Lis Pendens filed in May 2006 and/or requested that a 
bond be posted during the appeal. Judge Wilper entered his Order on March 1,2007 denying the 
motion. Pursuant to that order the lis pendens was authorized to remain ofrecord. (R. 001393-
001409). As early as March 1, 2007 the Appell ants knew that they h:Jd a right to maintain a lis 
pendens even during ::Ill uppeal. The appellants voluntarily released the Notice of Lis Pendens 
long before the present appeal was filed. Under the prior judicial cletennination by Judge Wilper, 
litigants were entitled to maintain a lis pendens even during an appeal. Neither the Taylor 
brotbers nor the trust could have been damaged by the filing of the lis pendens before Judge 
Greenwood, because the appellants are entitled to maintain a lis pendens even during the 
appellate process. 
Both lis pendens were properly recorded and reasonably connected to the litigation. 
Although, tec1ll1ically, the Appellants Gould have maintained the lis pendens through an appeal in 
the cun'ent case (as allowed by Judge Wilper dUIing the appeal in Taylor v. Maile), the 
Appellants voluntarily removed the same. Likewise, the lis pendens was substituted with a 
Vendee's Lien in the Judge Wilper matter. (R. 001421, 001427-001429). Judge Wilper had 
approved the Vendee's Lien as a mechanism to protect the Appellants' light to payment. The 
Appellants filed their VerifIed Motion to Foreclosure tbe Vendee's Lien in November 2009. (R. 
001445). Until the purchase p1ice was retumed, pursuant to I.e. § 45-1302, Appellants were 
entitled to maintain their lis pendens. 
54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 10 provides: 
§ 10. Generally 
The doctrine of lis pendens applies to all suits or actions which directly affect real 
property. In some states, tIle cause of action must involve some legal interest in 
the challenged real prope1ty in order for lis pendens to apply. Similarly, in other 
states, a notice of lis pendens is authorized only as to a suit in which real prope1ty 
is Itinvolved," which refers only to realty actually and directly brought into 
litigatjon by pleadings in a pending suit and as to which some relief is sought 
respecting that particular prope1ty. A classic example of a suit in which real 
prope1ty is "in vol ved" is a suit which seeks to have a prior conveyance of the 
property set asjde or declared null and void. Lis pendens applies to all claims 
affecting titl e to real prope1ty, use and occupation of property, and interest in 
property. 
However, lis pendens generally applies not only to those actions which involve 
the question of title or a possessory interest but also to litigation that does not seek 
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to change tile ownership ofland in any way but does involve a detelmination of 
certain rights and liabilities incident to ownership. 11ms, lis pendens applies to 
actions which are brought to enforce any lien, charge, or encumbrance against real 
propeliy. FUliher, it is not improper to file a lis pendens pursuant to an action 
seeking equitable reIiefwith respect to the propelty thot is the subject of the lis 
pendens. 
The claims before Judge Wilper related initially to title and tllereafier to equitable lights 
affecting the Linder Road propelty. The Vendee's Lien celiainly qualifies as a legal proceeding 
which involve a detennination of celiain rights and liabilities incident to ownership. I.e. § 45-
1301 clearly establishes this proposition and as such there was no actionable wrong committed 
by any of the Appellants. 
The Appellants asselied a variety of claims. The AppelIonts requested a constructive 
trust to be imposed based upon the fraudulent and criminal activity of the Respondents. In 
addition, tbe AppeIIants requested reliefunder the Idaho Racketeeling Statute. 
The language under I.e. § 18-7803 and § 18-7804 cJearlyprovides tbat a claim only arises as a 
result of activity amounting to tbe specific statutOlY criminal activity that is precisely aIJeged to 
bave OCCUlTed in the present matter. Specifically the Statutes provide: 
18-7803 DEFrNITIONS. 
As used in this cbapter, (a) "Racketeeling" means illl}' act which is chargeabJe 
or indictable lmder tbe following sections of the Idabo Code or which are 
equivalent acts cbargeable or indictable as equivalent crimes ul1der the laws of any 
other jurisdiction: 
(l0) Fraudulent practices, false pretenses, insurance fraud, financial 
transaction card climes and fraud generaIIy (sections 18-2403, 18-2706, 18-3002, 
18-3101,18-3124,18-3125, 18-3126, 18-6713,41-293,41-294 and 41-1306, 
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Idaho Code); 
(17) PeJ:jury (sections 18-540 I and 18-5410, Idaho Code); 
18-7804 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES -- PENALTIES. 
(a) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived 
directly or indirectly from a pattern ofracketeeling activity in which the person 
has participated, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any pmt ofthe proceeds or 
the proceeds derived from the investment or LIse thereofin the acquisition of any 
interest in, or the establislu11ent or operation of, any enterprise or real property. 
One of the remedies available umleJ- the § 18-7804 is a retum of real propelty obtained as 
a result ofthe racketeering acti vity. Clearly the present matter involved legitimate claims to real 
propelty whicl1 autl1011zed the filing oftbe lis pendens. The jury verdict was improper under 
either count whicl1 the jl.lJY was allowed to consider and the verdict should be set aside. 
l The Re,',pOluients Are Not Entitled to Attorney Fees Oil Appeal. 
TIle Respondents have requested attomey fees pursuant to I.C. § 12- J 21, and LA.R. 41. 
An award of attomey fees on appeal is appropliate "if the law is well-settled and the appellants 
have made no substantial showing t110t the district court misapplied the law,'" Keller v. Rogstad, 
112 Id. 484, 489, 733 P.2d 705, 71 0 (1987), quoting Davis v. Gage, 109 Id. 1019, 103 J, 711 P.2d 
730,732 (Ct. App.1985). Under I.e. § 12-121, the COLlJt may award reasonable attorney fees to 
tIle prevailing party in a civil action if the appellate COUlt is lett \vith the abiding belief that tIle 
appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Cramer v. 
Slater, 146 Id. 868, 881,204 P.3d 508, 521 (1009). The Respondents have not met their burden 
for any alvard of attomey fees on appeal. 
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legitimate, triable issue offact, attorney fees may not be awarded uncler I.e. § 12-121 even 
tJlOugh the losing party has asserted factual or Jegal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or 
without foundation. Judge Greenwood never detennined the action ,vas frivolous, unreasonable, 
or without foundation at the trial level. 
An action is not deemed to have been broUgJlt frivolously simply because it ultimately 
fails. Edwards v. Donart, 116 Tel. 687,688, 778 P.2d 809,810 (1989). In deciding whether an 
award of attomey's fees is proper, "tIle sole question is whether the losing party's position is so 
plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonahle or without foundation." Sun Valley 
S110ppillg Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Id. 87,92,803 P.2d 993,998 (1991), quoting 
Severson v. Henmtl1l1, 116 ld. 497, 777 P.2d269 (1989). A misperceptioI1, by a party, oftbe law 
is not, by itself, umeaBonable conduct. Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Yd. 874, 865 
P.2d 965 (1993), Wil1g v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 rd. 905, 91 1, 684 P.2d 307, 313 (Ct. 
App.1984). 
It is of interest that none of the Respondents have requested S~1l1ctjons against Appellants 
for an improper appeal. The current appellate involves the same principles of law that were 
argued before the lower cOuli---- the application of res judicota, the affects of a fi-oud upon a 
comi by officers of a cOUli. Judge Greenwood allowed a trial on the merits relating to abuse of 
process and intentional interference with business uclvantage reasoning tlwt the legal proceedings 
pursued by the Appellants were for improper purpose, to harass and to increase the course of 
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litigation. J\lot only "V ere tbose legal principles adva11ced in good faith in the district court before 
Judge Greemvooc!, l,ui the Appellants are (]clv~l1lcing legiti111<lte legd principles in pointing out 
the criminal conduct (If the Respondents in obtaining the Judgment on BCllllefkiaries' Claims. 
If an appeu1 does not meet the :,tandarcls of 1.A.R. J J.1 and "it is intcll)Oscd for any 
improper purpose, SUcll as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or neeelless increase in the cost 
oflitigatiol1," then this Court "shall impose upun the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction 'vvhich may include ... the amount of reasonable expenses incUlTecl 
because of the filing ... including a rea~)()JlabJe attomey's fee." Id.; Bowls v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 
132 Id. 371, 377, 973 P.2c1 142, 148 (1999), Rodriguez v. Dept. of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 94, 
29 P.3d -101, 405 (200 I). The Respondents have not requested sanctions pursuant to LA.R. 11.1, 
as tlJere exic.;ts 110 improper purposes at the appellate level just as there was no improper pUll)()ses 
at t11e tIied I eveJ. 
In the present matter, tIle Appellants properJY11l8de a record demonstrating criminal 
activity OIl the part of the Respondents in obtaining tIle Judgment on Beneficiaries' Cbims. Such 
claims ael\'emcee! by the Appellants consisted entirely of the Respondents' own swom testimony, 
verified pJeadings and statements against their interests. The Appellants properly alleged various 
tort claims in addition to the fi-oudulent-crill1inal conduct of the Respondents and ottollleys fees 
Clnd costs can not be assessed against the Appell::mts. The Appellants re~:pectfully request thot 
this Court deny the Respondents' request for fees on appe~d. 
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iV. CONCLU,srON 
Let not ~llly us fe~II' the consequC'.nees of st1l1ding up against criminal ;Ictivity. \Vhether 
it be jn the streets ofMi~lmi or [I courthollse in tloi,';c, Jdaho, Jet each of us he duty'-bollnd to 
pllr~;lIe wh~Jt is right [Ind true. 
DA TED this 26(h day of September, 20 II. 
THOMA,S b. A1AfLE IV., pro se. 
I .' 
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